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Abstract
In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incen-
tive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive
compatible. Given samples from the agents’ type distribution, we show how to estimate the
extent to which an agent can improve his utility by misreporting his type. We do so by first
measuring the maximum utility an agent can gain by misreporting his type on average over the
samples, assuming his true and reported types are from a finite subset—which our technique
constructs—of the type space. The challenge is that by measuring utility gains over a finite
subset of the type space, we might miss type pairs θ and θˆ where an agent with type θ can
greatly improve his utility by reporting type θˆ. Indeed, our primary technical contribution is
proving that the maximum utility gain over this finite subset nearly matches the maximum
utility gain overall, despite the volatility of the utility functions we study. We apply our tools
to the single-item and combinatorial first-price auctions, generalized second-price auction, dis-
criminatory auction, uniform-price auction, and second-price auction with spiteful bidders.
1 Introduction
Incentive compatibility [Hurwicz, 1972] is a fundamental concept in mechanism design. Under an
incentive compatible mechanism, it is in every agent’s best interest to report their type truthfully.
Nonetheless, practitioners have long employed mechanisms that are not incentive compatible, also
called manipulable mechanisms. This is the case in many settings for selling, buying, matching
(such as school choice), voting, and so on. For example, most real-world auctions are implemented
using the first-price mechanism. In multi-unit sales settings, the U.S. Treasury has used discrimi-
natory auctions, a variant of the first-price auction, to sell treasury bills since 1929 [Krishna, 2002].
Similarly, electricity generators in the U.K. use discriminatory auctions to sell their output [Kr-
ishna, 2002]. Sponsored search auctions are typically implemented using variants of the generalized
second-price auction [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian, 2007]. In the past year, many major display
ad exchanges including AppNexus, Rubicon, and Index Exchange have transitioned to first-price
auctions, driven by ad buyers who believe it offers a higher degree of transparency [Parkin, 2018,
Harada, 2018]. Finally, nearly all fielded combinatorial auctions are manipulable. Essentially all
combinatorial sourcing auctions are implemented using the first-price mechanism [Sandholm, 2013].
Combinatorial spectrum auctions are conducted using a variety of manipulable mechanisms. Even
the “incentive auction” used to source spectrum licenses back from low-value broadcasters—which
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has sometimes been hailed as obviously incentive compatible—is manipulable once one takes into
account the fact that many owners own multiple broadcasting stations, or the fact that stations do
not only have the option to keep or relinquish their license, but also the option to move to (two)
less desirable spectrum ranges [Nguyen and Sandholm, 2015].
Many reasons have been suggested why manipulable mechanisms are used in practice. First,
the rules are often easier to explain. Second, incentive compatibility ceases to hold even in the
relatively simple context of the Vickrey auction when determining one’s own valuation is costly
(for example, due to computation or information gathering effort) [Sandholm, 2000]. Third, bid-
ders may have even more incentive to behave strategically when they can conduct computation or
information gathering on each others’ valuations, and if they can incrementally decide how to allo-
cate valuation-determination effort [Larson and Sandholm, 2001, 2005]. Fourth, in combinatorial
settings, well-known incentive-compatible mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism require bidders to submit bids for every bundle, which generally requires a prohibitive
amount of valuation computation (solving a local planning problem for potentially every bundle,
and each planning problem, itself, can be NP-complete) or information acquisition [Sandholm,
1993, Parkes, 1999, Conen and Sandholm, 2001, Sandholm and Boutilier, 2006]. Fifth, in settings
such as sourcing, single-shot incentive compatible mechanisms such as the VCG are generally not
incentive compatible when the bid-taker uses bids from one auction to adjust the parameters of
later auctions in later years [Sandholm, 2013]. Sixth, incentive compatible mechanisms may leak
the agents’ sensitive private information [Rothkopf et al., 1990]. Seventh, incentive compatibility
typically ceases to hold if agents are not risk neutral (i.e., the utility functions are not quasi-linear).
There are also sound theoretical reasons why the designer sometimes prefers manipulable mecha-
nisms. Specifically, there exist settings where the designer does better than under any incentive
compatible mechanism if the agents cannot solve hard computational or communication problems,
and equally well if they can [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004, Othman and Sandholm, 2009].
Due in part to the ubiquity of manipulable mechanisms, a growing body of additional research
has explored mechanisms that are not incentive compatible [Kothari et al., 2003, Archer et al., 2004,
Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007, Dekel et al., 2010, Lubin and Parkes, 2012, Mennle and Seuken, 2014,
Du¨tting et al., 2015, Azevedo and Budish, 2018, Golowich et al., 2018, Du¨tting et al., 2019, Feng
et al., 2018]. A popular and widely-studied relaxation of incentive compatibility is γ-incentive
compatibility [Kothari et al., 2003, Archer et al., 2004, Dekel et al., 2010, Lubin and Parkes, 2012,
Mennle and Seuken, 2014, Du¨tting et al., 2015, Azevedo and Budish, 2018], which requires that no
agent can improve his utility by more than γ when he misreports his type.
1.1 Our contributions
Much of the literature on γ-incentive compatibility rests on the strong assumption that the agents’
type distribution is known. In reality, this information is rarely available. We relax this assumption
and instead assume we only have samples from the distribution [Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2004,
2005, Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015]. We present techniques with provable guarantees that the
mechanism designer can use to estimate how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. We
analyze both the ex-interim and ex-ante1 settings: in the ex-interim case, we bound the amount
any agent can improve his utility by misreporting his type, in expectation over the other agents’
types, no matter his true type. In the weaker ex-ante setting, the expectation is also over the
agent’s true type as well. In the ex-interim case, we adopt the common assumption that each
1We do not study ex-post or dominant-strategy approximate incentive compatibility because they are worst-
case, distribution-independent notions. Therefore, we cannot hope to measure the ex-post or dominant-strategy
approximation factors using samples from the agents’ type distribution.
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agent’s type is drawn independently from the other agents’ types. In the ex-ante case, we drop this
assumption: the agents’ types may be arbitrarily correlated.
Our estimate is simple: it measures the maximum utility an agent can gain by misreporting his
type on average over the samples, whenever his true and reported types are from a finite subset
of the type space. We bound the difference between our incentive compatibility estimate and the
true incentive compatibility approximation factor γ.
We apply our estimation technique to a variety of auction classes. We begin with the first-price
auction, in both single-item and combinatorial settings. Our guarantees can be used by display ad
exchanges, for instance, to measure the extent to which incentive compatibility will be compromised
if the exchange transitions to using first-price auctions [Parkin, 2018, Harada, 2018]. In the single-
item setting, we prove that the difference between our estimate and the true incentive compatibility
approximation factor is O˜
((
n+ κ−1
)
/
√
N
)
, where n is the number of bidders, N is the number of
samples, and [0, κ] contains the range of the density functions defining the agents’ type distribution.
We prove the same bound for the second-price auction with spiteful bidders [Brandt et al., 2007,
Morgan et al., 2003, Sharma and Sandholm, 2010, Tang and Sandholm, 2012], where each bidder’s
utility not only increases when his surplus increases but also decreases when the other bidders’
surpluses increase.
In a similar direction, we analyze the class of generalized second-price auctions [Edelman et al.,
2007], where m sponsored search slots are for sale. The mechanism designer assigns a real-valued
weight per bidder, collects a bid per bidder indicating their value per click, and allocates the
slots in order of the bidders’ weighted bids. In this setting, we prove that the difference between
our incentive compatibility estimate and the true incentive compatibility approximation bound is
O˜
((
n3/2 + κ−1
)
/
√
N
)
.
We also analyze multi-parameter mechanisms beyond the first-price combinatorial auction,
namely, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, which are used extensively in markets
around the world [Krishna, 2002]. In both, the auctioneer has m identical units of a single good to
sell. Each bidder submits m bids indicating their value for each additional unit of the good. The
number of goods the auctioneer allocates to each bidder equals the number of bids that bidder has
in the top m bids. Under a discriminatory auction, each agent pays the amount she bid for the
number of units she is allocated. Under a uniform-price auction, the agents pay the market-clearing
price, meaning the total amount demanded equals the total amount supplied. In both cases, we
prove that the difference between our incentive compatibility estimate and the true incentive com-
patibility approximation bound is O˜
((
nm2 + κ−1
)
/
√
N
)
.
A strength of our estimation techniques is that they are application-agnostic. For example,
they can be used as a tool in incremental mechanism design [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007], a
subfield of automated mechanism design [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, Sandholm, 2003], where
the mechanism designer gradually adds incentive compatibility constraints to her optimization
problem until she has met a desired incentive compatibility guarantee.
Key challenges. To prove our guarantees, we must estimate the value γ defined such that no
agent can misreport his type in order to improve his expected utility by more than γ, no matter
his true type. We propose estimating γ by measuring the extent to which an agent can improve his
utility by misreporting his type on average over the samples, whenever his true and reported types
are from a finite subset G of the type space. We denote this estimate as γˆ. The challenge is that
by searching over a subset of the type space, we might miss pairs of types θ and θˆ where an agent
with type θ can greatly improve his expected utility by misreporting his type as θˆ. Indeed, utility
3
functions are often volatile in mechanism design settings. For example, under the first- and second-
price auctions, nudging an agent’s bid from below the other agents’ largest bid to above will change
the allocation, causing a jump in utility. Thus, there are two questions we must address: which
finite subset should we search over and how do we relate our estimate γˆ to the true approximation
factor γ?
We provide two approaches to constructing the cover G. The first is to run a greedy procedure
based off a classic algorithm from theoretical machine learning. This approach is extremely versatile:
it provides strong guarantees no matter the setting. However, it may be difficult to implement.
Meanwhile, implementing our second approach is straightforward: the cover is simply a uniform
grid over the type space (assuming the type space equals [0, 1]m for some integer m). The efficacy
of this approach depends on a “niceness” property that holds under mild assumptions. To analyze
this second approach, we must understand how the edge-length of the grid effects our error bound
relating the estimate γˆ to the true approximation factor γ. To do so, we rely on the notion of
dispersion [Balcan et al., 2018a]. Roughly speaking, a set of piecewise Lipschitz functions is (w, k)-
dispersed if every ball of radius w in the domain contains at most k of the functions’ discontinuities.
Given a set of N samples from the distribution over agents’ types, we analyze the dispersion of
function sequences from two related families. In both families, the function sequences are of length
N : each function is defined by one of the N samples. In the first family, each sequence is defined
by a true type θ and measures a fixed agent’s utility as a function of her reported type θˆ, when
the other agents’ bids are defined by the samples. In the second family, each sequence is defined
by a reported type θˆ and measures the agent’s utility as a function of her true type θ. We show
that if all function sequences from both classes are (w, k)-dispersed, then we can use a grid with
edge-length w to discretize the agents’ type space.
We show that for a wide range of mechanism classes, dispersion holds under mild assumptions.
As we describe more in Section 3.1.2, this requires us to prove that with high probability, each
function sequence from several infinite families of sequences is dispersed. This facet of our analysis
is notably different from prior research by Balcan et al. [2018a]: in their applications, it is enough
to show that with high probability, a single, finite sequence of functions is dispersed. Our proofs
thus necessitate that we carefully examine the structure of the utility functions that we analyze. In
particular, we prove that across all of the infinitely-many sequences, the functions’ discontinuities
are invariant. As a result, it is enough to prove dispersion for single generic sequence in order to
guarantee dispersion for all of the sequences.
Finally, we prove that for both choices of the cover G, so long as the intrinsic complexities of the
agents’ utility functions are not too large (as measured by the learning-theoretic notion of pseudo-
dimension [Pollard, 1984]), then our estimate γˆ quickly converges to the true approximation factor
γ as the number of samples grows.
1.2 Additional related research
Strategy-proofness in the large. Azevedo and Budish [2018] propose a variation on approxi-
mate incentive compatibility called strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L). SP-L requires that it is
approximately optimal for agents to report their types truthfully in sufficiently large markets. As in
our paper, SP-L is a condition on ex-interim γ-incentive compatibility. The authors argue that SP-
L approximates, in large markets, attractive properties of a mechanism such as strategic simplicity
and robustness. They categorize a number of mechanisms as either SP-L or not. For example,
they show that the discriminatory auction is manipulable in the large whereas the uniform-price
auction is SP-L. Measuring a mechanism’s SP-L approximation factor requires knowledge of the
distribution over agents’ types, whereas we only require sample access to this distribution. More-
4
over, we do not make any large-market assumptions: our guarantees hold regardless of the number
of agents.
Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Pathak and So¨nmez
[2013] analyze ex-post incentive compatibility without any connection to approximate incentive
compatibility. They say that one mechanism M is at least as manipulable as another M ′ if every
type profile that is vulnerable to manipulation under M is also vulnerable to manipulation under
M ′. They apply their formalism in the context of school assignment mechanisms, the uniform-
price auction, the discriminatory auction, and several keyword auctions. We do not study ex-post
approximate incentive compatibility because it is a worst-case, distribution-independent notion.
Therefore, we cannot hope to measure an ex-post approximation factor using samples from the
agents’ type distribution. Rather, we are concerned with providing data-dependent bounds on the
ex-interim and ex-ante approximation factors. Another major difference is that our work provides
quantitative results on manipulability while theirs provides boolean comparisons as to the relative
manipulability of mechanisms. Finally, our measure applies to all mechanisms while theirs cannot
rank all mechanisms because in many settings, pairs of mechanisms are incomparable according to
their boolean measure.
Mechanism design via deep learning. In mechanism design via deep learning [Feng et al.,
2018, Du¨tting et al., 2019, Golowich et al., 2018], the learning algorithm receives samples from the
distribution over agents’ types. The resulting allocation and payment functions are characterized
by neural networks, and thus the corresponding mechanism may not be incentive compatible. In
an attempt to make these mechanisms nearly incentive compatible, the authors of these works add
constraints to the deep learning optimization problem enforcing that the resulting mechanism be
incentive compatible over a set of buyer values sampled from the underlying, unknown distribution.
In research that was conducted simultaneously, Du¨tting et al. [2019] provide guarantees on the
extent to which the resulting mechanism—characterized by a neural network—is approximately in-
centive compatible, in the sense of expected ex-post incentive compatibility : in expectation over all
agents’ types, what is the maximum amount that an agent can improve her utility by misreporting
her type? This is a different notion of approximate incentive compatibility than those we study.
In short, we bound the maximum expected change in utility an agent can induce by misreporting
her type (Definition 2.1), no matter her true type, where the expectation is over the other agents’
types. In contrast, Du¨tting et al. [2019] bound the expected maximum change in utility an agent
can induce, where the expectation is over all agents’ types. As a result, our bounds are complemen-
tary, but not overlapping. Moreover, the sets of mechanisms we analyze and Du¨tting et al. [2019]
analyze are disjoint: Du¨tting et al. [2019] provide bounds for mechanisms represented as neural net-
works, whereas we instantiate our guarantees for single-item and combinatorial first-price auctions,
generalized second-price auction, discriminatory auction, uniform-price auction, and second-price
auction with spiteful bidders.
Sample complexity of revenue maximization. A long line of research has studied revenue
maximization via machine learning from a theoretical perspective (including, for example, work
by Elkind [2007], Balcan et al. [2008], and Cole and Roughgarden [2014]). The mechanism designer
receives samples from the type distribution which she uses to find a mechanism that is, ideally,
nearly optimal in expectation. That research has only studied incentive compatible mechanism
classes. Moreover, in this paper, it is not enough to provide generalization guarantees; we must
both compute our estimate of the incentive compatibility approximation factor and bound our
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estimate’s error. This type of error has nothing to do with revenue functions, but rather utility
functions. These factors in conjunction mean that our research differs significantly from prior
research on generalization guarantees in mechanism design.
In a related direction, Chawla et al. [2014, 2016, 2017] study counterfactual revenue estimation.
Given two auctions, they provide techniques for estimating one of the auction’s equilibrium revenue
from the other auction’s equilibrium bids. They also study social welfare in this context. Thus,
their research is tied to selling mechanisms, whereas we study more general mechanism design
problems from an application-agnostic perspective.
Incentive compatibility from a buyer’s perspective. Lahaie et al. [2018] also provide tools
for estimating approximate incentive compatibility, but from the buyer’s perspective rather than
the mechanism designer’s perspective. As such, the type of information available to their estimation
tools versus ours is different. Moreover, they focus on ad auctions, whereas we study mechanism
design in general and apply our techniques to a wide range of settings and mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries and notation
There are n agents who each have a type. We denote agent i’s type as θi, which is an element of a
(potentially infinite) set Θi. A mechanism takes as input the agents’ reported types, which it uses to
choose an outcome. We denote agent i’s reported type as θˆi ∈ Θi. We denote all n agents’ types as
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) and reported types as θˆ =
(
θˆ1, . . . , θˆn
)
. For i ∈ [n], we use the standard notation
θ−i ∈ ×j 6=iΘj to denote all n− 1 agents’ types except agent i. Using this notation, we denote the
type profile θ representing all n agents’ types as θ = (θi,θ−i). Similarly, θˆ =
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
. We assume
there is a distribution D over all n agents’ types, and thus the support of D is contained in ×ni=1Θi.
We use D|θi to denote the conditional distribution given θi, so the support of D|θi is contained in
×j 6=iΘj . We assume that we can draw samples θ(1),θ(2), . . . independently from D. This is the
same assumption made in a long line of work on mechanism design via machine learning (including,
for example, work by Elkind [2007], Balcan et al. [2008], and Cole and Roughgarden [2014]).
Given a mechanism M and agent i ∈ [n], we use the notation ui,M
(
θ, θˆ
)
to denote the utility
agent i receives when the agents have types θ and reported types θˆ. We assume2 it maps to [−1, 1].
When θ−i = θˆ−i, we use the simplified notation ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
:= ui,M
(
(θi,θ−i) ,
(
θˆi,θ−i
))
.
At a high level, a mechanism is incentive compatible if no agent can ever increase her utility
by misreporting her type. A mechanism is γ-incentive compatible if each agent can increase her
utility by an additive factor of at most γ by misreporting her type [Kothari et al., 2003, Archer
et al., 2004, Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007, Dekel et al., 2010, Lubin and Parkes, 2012, Mennle
and Seuken, 2014, Du¨tting et al., 2015, Azevedo and Budish, 2018, Feng et al., 2018, Golowich
et al., 2018, Du¨tting et al., 2019]. In the main body of this paper, we concentrate on ex-interim
approximate incentive compatibility [Azevedo and Budish, 2018, Lubin and Parkes, 2012].
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is ex-interim γ-incentive compatible if for each i ∈ [n] and all
θi, θˆi ∈ Θi, agent i with type θi can increase her expected utility by an additive factor of at
most γ by reporting her type as θˆi, so long as the other agents report truthfully. In other words,
Eθ−i∼D|θi [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)] ≥ Eθ−i∼D|θi
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− γ.
2Our estimation error only increases by a multiplicative factor of H if the range of the utility functions is [−H,H]
instead of [−1, 1].
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In Appendix E, we study ex-ante approximate incentive compatibility, where the above defini-
tion holds in expectation over the draw of the types θ ∼ D.
We do not study ex-post3 or dominant-strategy4 approximate incentive compatibility because
they are worst-case, distribution-independent notions. Therefore, we cannot hope to measure the
ex-post or dominant-strategy approximation factors using samples from the agents’ type distribu-
tion.
3 Estimating approximate ex-interim incentive compatibility
In this section, we show how to estimate the ex-interim incentive compatibility approximation
guarantee using data. We assume there is an unknown distribution D over agents’ types, and we
operate under the common assumption [Lubin and Parkes, 2012, Azevedo and Budish, 2018, Cai
and Daskalakis, 2017, Yao, 2014, Cai et al., 2016, Goldner and Karlin, 2016, Babaioff et al., 2017,
Hart and Nisan, 2012] that the agents’ types are independently distributed. In other words, for
each agent i ∈ [n], there exists a distribution φi over their type space Θi such that D = ×ni=1φi.
(In Appendix E, we extend our analysis to approximate ex-ante incentive compatibility under no
assumption about the underlying distribution, which is a weaker notion of incentive compatibility,
but also a weaker assumption on the distribution.) For each agent i ∈ [n], we receive a set S−i of
samples independently drawn from D−i = ×j 6=iφj . For each mechanism M ∈ M, we show how to
use the samples to estimate a value γˆM such that:
With probability 1−δ over the draw of the n sets of samples S−1, . . . ,S−n, for any agent
i ∈ [n] and all pairs θi, θˆi ∈ Θi, Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
≤ γˆM .
To this end, one simple approach, informally, is to estimate γˆM by measuring the extent to
which any agent i with any type θi can improve his utility by misreporting his type, averaged
over all profiles in S−i. In other words, we can estimate γˆM by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
) . (1)
Unfortunately, in full generality, there might not be a finite-time procedure to solve this optimization
problem, so in Section 3.1, we propose more nuanced approaches based on optimizing over finite
subsets of Θi ×Θi. As a warm-up and a building block for our main theorems in that section, we
prove that with probability 1− δ, for all mechanisms M ∈M,
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ), (2)
3A mechanism M is ex-post incentive compatible if for each i ∈ [n] and all θi, θˆi ∈ Θi, and all θ−i ∈ ×j 6=iΘj , agent
i with type θi cannot increase her utility by reporting her type as θˆi, so long as the other agents report truthfully.
In other words, ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i) ≥ ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
.
4A mechanism M is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if for each i ∈ [n] and all θi, θˆi ∈ Θi, agent i with type
θi cannot increase her utility by reporting her type as θˆi, no matter which types the other agents report. In other
words, for all θ−i, θˆ−i ∈ ×j 6=iΘj , ui,M
(
(θi,θ−i) ,
(
θi, θˆ−i
))
≥ ui,M
(
(θi,θ−i) ,
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
))
.
7
where M(N, δ) is an error term that converges to zero as the number N of samples grows. Its
convergence rate depends on the intrinsic complexity of the utility functions corresponding to the
mechanisms in M, which we formalize using the learning-theoretic tool pseudo-dimension. We
define pseudo-dimension below for an abstract class A of functions mapping a domain X to [−1, 1].
Definition 3.1 (Pseudo-dimension [Pollard, 1984]). Let S = {x(1), . . . , x(N)} ⊆ X be a set of
elements from the domain of the functions in A and let z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R be a set of targets. We
say that z(1), . . . , z(N) witness the shattering of S by A if for all subsets T ⊆ S, there exists some
function aT ∈ A such that for all x(j) ∈ T , aT
(
x(j)
) ≤ z(j) and for all x(j) 6∈ T , aT (x(j)) > z(j).
If there exists some vector z ∈ RN that witnesses the shattering of S by A, then we say that S is
shatterable by A. Finally, the pseudo-dimension of A, denoted Pdim (A), is the size of the largest
set that is shatterable by A.
Theorem 3.1 provides an abstract generalization bound in terms of pseudo-dimension.
Theorem 3.1 (Pollard [1984]). Let Φ be a distribution over X . With probability 1 − δ over
x(1), . . . , x(N) ∼ Φ, for all a ∈ A,
∣∣∣ 1N ∑Nj=1 a (x(j))− Ex∼Φ[a(x)]∣∣∣ ≤ √2dN ln eNd +√ 12N ln 2δ , where
d = Pdim(A).
We now use Theorem 3.1 to prove that the error term M(N, δ) in Equation (2) converges
to zero as N increases. To this end, for any mechanism M , any agent i ∈ [n], and any pair
of types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi, let ui,M,θi,θˆi : ×j 6=iΘj → [−1, 1] be a function that maps the types θ−i
of the other agents to the utility of agent i with type θi and reported type θˆi when the other
agents report their types truthfully. In other words, ui,M,θi,θˆi (θ−i) = ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
. Let Fi,M
be the set of all such functions defined by mechanisms M from the class M. In other words,
Fi,M =
{
ui,M,θi,θˆi
∣∣∣ θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,M ∈M}. We now analyze the convergence rate of the error term
M(N, δ). The full proof is in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.2. With probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i,
for all mechanisms M ∈M and agents i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Proof sketch. Fix an arbitrary bidder i ∈ [n]. By Theorem 3.1, we know that with probability
1 − δ/n, for every pair of types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi and every mechanism M ∈ M, the expected utility
of agent i with type θi and reported type θˆi (in expectation over θ−i ∼ D−i) is -close to his
average utility (averaged over θ−i ∈ S−i), where  = O˜
(√
di/N
)
. We use this fact to show that
when agent i misreports his type, he cannot increase his expected utility by more than a factor of
2+ maxθi,θˆi∈Θi
{
1
N
∑N
j=1 ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)}
.
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3.1 Incentive compatibility guarantees via finite covers
In the previous section, we presented an empirical estimate of the ex-interim incentive compatibility
approximation factor (Equation (1)) and we showed that it quickly converges to the true approx-
imation factor. However, there may not be a finite-time procedure for computing Equation (1) in
its full generality, restated below:
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
) . (3)
In this section, we address that challenge. A simple alternative approach is to fix a finite cover of
Θi ×Θi, which we denote as G ⊂ Θi ×Θi, and approximate Equation (3) by measuring the extent
to which any agent i can improve his utility by misreporting his type when his true and reported
types are elements of the cover G, averaged over all profiles in S−i. In other words, we estimate
Equation (3) as:
max
(θi,θˆi)∈G
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
) . (4)
This raises two natural questions: how do we select the cover G and how close are the optimal
solutions to Equations (3) and (4)? We provide two simple, intuitive approaches to selecting the
cover G. The first is to run a greedy procedure (see Section 3.1.1) and the second is to create a
uniform grid over the type space (assuming Θi = [0, 1]
m for some integer m; see Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Covering via a greedy procedure
In this section, we show how to construct the cover G of Θi × Θi greedily, based off a classic
learning-theoretic algorithm. We then show that when we use the cover G to estimate the incentive
compatibility approximation factor (via Equation (4)), the estimate quickly converges to the true
approximation factor. This greedy procedure is summarized by Algorithm 1. For any v ∈ RN , we
use the notation B1 (v, ) = {v′ : ‖v′ − v‖1 ≤ }. To simplify notation, let U be the set of vectors
defined in Algorithm 1:
U =

1
N

ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(N)
−i
)
 : θi, θˆi ∈ Θi
 .
Note that the solution to Equation (3) equals maxv∈U
∑N
i=1 v[i]. The algorithm greedily selects
a set of vectors V ⊆ U , or equivalently, a set of type pairs G ⊆ Θi × Θi as follows: while U \(⋃
v∈V B1 (v, )
)
is non-empty, it chooses an arbitrary vector v′ in the set, adds it to V , and adds
the pair
(
θi, θˆi
)
∈ Θi×Θi defining the vector v′ to G. Classic results from learning theory [Anthony
and Bartlett, 2009] guarantee that this greedy procedure will repeat for at most (8eN/(di))
2di
iterations, where di = Pdim (Fi,M).
We now relate the true incentive compatibility approximation factor to the solution to Equa-
tion (4) when the cover is constructed using Algorithm 1. The full proof is in Appendix C.
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Algorithm 1 Greedy cover construction
Input: Mechanism M ∈M, set of samples S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, accuracy parameter  > 0.
1: Let U be the set of vectors U ←

1
N

ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(N)
−i
)
 : θi, θˆi ∈ Θi
 .
2: Let V ← ∅ and G ← ∅.
3: while U \ (⋃v∈V B1 (v, )) 6= ∅ do
4: Select an arbitrary vector v′ ∈ U \ (⋃v∈V B1 (v, )).
5: Let θi, θˆi ∈ Θi be the types such that v′ = 1N

ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(N)
−i
)
 .
6: Add v′ to V and
(
θi, θˆi
)
to G.
Output: The cover G ⊆ Θi ×Θi.
Theorem 3.3. Given a set S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, a mechanism M ∈M, and accuracy parameter
 > 0, let G (S−i,M, ) be the cover returned by Algorithm 1. With probability 1− δ over the draw
of the n sets S−i ∼ DN−i, for every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
(θi,θˆi)∈G(S−i,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ + O˜
(√
di
N
)
, (5)
where di = Pdim (Fi,M). Moreover, with probability 1, |G (S−i,M, )| ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di.
Proof sketch. Inequality (5) follows from Theorem 3.2, the fact that V is an -cover of U (where U
and V are the sets defined in Algorithm 1), and the equivalence of G (S−i,M, ) and V . The bound
on |G (S−i,M, )| follows from classic learning-theoretic results [Anthony and Bartlett, 2009].
3.1.2 Covering via a uniform grid
The greedy approach in Section 3.1.1 is extremely versatile: no matter the type space Θi, when
we use the resulting cover to estimate the incentive compatibility approximation factor (via Equa-
tion (4)), the estimate quickly converges to the true approximation factor. However, implementing
the greedy procedure (Algorithm 1) might be computationally challenging because at each round,
it is necessary to check if U \ (⋃v∈V B1 (v, )) is nonempty and if so, select a vector from the set.
In this section, we propose an alternative, extremely simple approach to selecting a cover G: using
a uniform grid over the type space. The efficacy of this approach depends on a “niceness” assump-
tion that holds under mild assumptions, as we prove in Section 3.2. Throughout this section, we
assume that Θi = [0, 1]
m for some integer m. We propose covering the type space using a w-grid
Gw over [0, 1]m, by which we mean a finite set of vectors in [0, 1]m such that for all p ∈ [0, 1]m,
there exists a vector p′ ∈ Gw such that ‖p− p′‖1 ≤ w. For example, if m = 1, we could define
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(a) Average of dispersed functions. (b) Average of functions that are not dispersed.
Figure 1: Illustration of Example 3.1. The lines in Figure 1a depict the average of four utility
functions corresponding to the first-price auction. The maximum of this average falls at the top
of the blue region. We evaluate the function in Figure 1a on the grid
{
0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , 1
}
, as depicted
by the dots. The maximum over the grid falls at the bottom of the blue region. In Figure 1b, we
illustrate the same concepts but for a different set of utility functions that are not as dispersed as
those in Figure 1a. As illustrated by the blue regions, the approximation over the grid is better for
the dispersed functions than the non-dispersed functions.
Gw =
{
0, 1b1/wc ,
2
b1/wc , . . . , 1
}
. We will estimate the expected incentive compatibility approximation
factor using Equation (4) with G = Gw×Gw. Throughout the rest of the paper, we discuss how the
choice of w effects the error bound. To do so, we will use the notion of dispersion, defined below.
Definition 3.2 (Balcan et al. [2018a]). Let a1, . . . , aN : Rd → R be a set of functions where each ai
is piecewise Lipschitz with respect to the `1-norm over a partition Pi of Rd. We say that Pi splits
a set A ⊆ Rd if A intersects with at least two sets in Pi. The set of functions is (w, k)-dispersed if
for every point p ∈ Rd, the ball {p′ ∈ Rd : ‖p− p′‖1 ≤ w} is split by at most k of the partitions
P1, . . . ,PN .
The smaller w is and the larger k is, the more “dispersed” the functions’ discontinuities are.
Moreover, the more jump discontinuities a set of functions has, the more difficult it is to approxi-
mately optimize its average using a grid. We illustrate this phenomenon in Example 3.1.
Example 3.1. Suppose there are two agents and M is the first-price single-item auction. For any
trio of types θ1, θ2, θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1], u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1, θ2
)
= 1{θˆ1>θ2}
(
θ1 − θˆ1
)
. Suppose θ1 = 1. Figure 1a
displays the function 14
∑
θ2∈S2 u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
where S2 =
{
1
5 ,
2
5 ,
3
5 ,
4
5
}
and Figure 1b displays the
function 14
∑
θ2∈S′2 u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
where S ′2 =
{
31
40 ,
32
40 ,
33
40 ,
34
40
}
.
In Figure 1, we evaluate each function on the grid G = {0, 14 , 12 , 34 , 1}. In Figure 1a, the maximum
over G better approximates the the maximum over [0, 1] compared to Figure 1b. In other words,
max
θˆ1∈[0,1]
∑
θ2∈S2
u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
−max
θˆ1∈G
∑
θ2∈S2
u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
(6)
< max
θˆ1∈[0,1]
∑
θ2∈S′2
u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
−max
θˆ1∈G
∑
θ2∈S′2
u1,M
(
1, θˆ1, θ2
)
. (7)
Intuitively, this is because the functions we average over in Figure 1a are more dispersed than the
functions we average over in Figure 1b. The differences described by Equations (6) and (7) are
represented by the shaded regions in Figures 1a and 1b, respectively.
We now state a helpful lemma which we use to prove this section’s main theorem. Informally,
it shows that we can measure the average amount that any agent can improve his utility by misre-
porting his type, even if we discretize his type space, so long as his utility function applied to the
samples demonstrates dispersion. The full proof is in Appendix C.
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Lemma 3.4. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with probability
1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for each mechanism M ∈ M and
agent i ∈ [n], the following conditions hold:
1. For any type θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise
Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
2. For any reported type θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are
piecewise Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then with probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i ∼ DN−i, for all mechanisms M ∈M and
agents i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN . (8)
Proof sketch. By definition of dispersion, the following conditions hold with probability 1− δ:
Condition 1. For all mechanisms M ∈M, agents i ∈ [n], types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, and pairs of reported
types θˆi, θˆ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if
∥∥∥θˆi − θˆ′i∥∥∥
1
≤ wi, then
∣∣∣ 1N ∑Nj=1 ui,M (θi, θˆi,θ(j)−i)− ui,M (θi, θˆ′i,θ(j)−i)∣∣∣ ≤
Liwi +
2ki
N .
Condition 2. For all mechanisms M ∈ M, agents i ∈ [n], reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, and pairs
of types θi,θ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if ‖θi − θ′i‖1 ≤ wi, then
∣∣∣ 1N ∑Nj=1 ui,M (θi, θˆi,θ(j)−i)− ui,M (θ′i, θˆi,θ(j)−i)∣∣∣ ≤
Liwi +
2ki
N .
We claim that Inequality (8) holds so long as Conditions 1 and 2 hold. To see why, suppose
they do both hold, and fix an arbitrary agent i ∈ [n], mechanism M ∈ M, and pair of types
θi, θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m. Consider the average amount agent i with type θi can improve his utility by
misreporting his type as θˆi:
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
. (9)
By definition of the grid Gwi , we know there are points p, pˆ ∈ Gwi such that ‖θi − p‖1 ≤ wi and∥∥∥θˆi − pˆ∥∥∥
1
≤ wi. Based on Conditions 1 and 2, we show that if we “snap” θi to p and θˆi to pˆ, we
will not increase Equation (9) by more than an additive factor of O (Liwi + ki/N). Since p and pˆ
are elements of Gwi , Inequality (8) holds so long as Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Since Conditions 1
and 2 hold with probability 1− δ, the lemma statement holds.
In Section 3.2, we prove that under mild assumptions, for a wide range of mechanisms, Con-
ditions 1 and 2 in Lemma 3.4 hold with Li = 1, wi = O
(
1/
√
N
)
, and ki = O˜
(√
N
)
, ignoring
problem-specific multiplicands. Thus, we find that 4Liwi + 8ki/N quickly converges to 0 as N
grows.
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Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.4 immediately imply this section’s main theorem. At a high level, it
states that any agent’s average utility gain when restricted to types on the grid is a close estimation
of the true incentive compatibility approximation factor, so long as his utility function applied to
the samples demonstrates dispersion. The full proof is in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with
probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for each mechanism
M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n], the following conditions hold:
1. For any θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
2. For any θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then with probability 1− 2δ, for every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ ,
where  = 4Liwi +
8ki
N + 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Proof sketch. Theorem 3.2 guarantees that with probability at most δ, the extent to which any
agent i can improve his utility by misreporting his type, averaged over all profiles in S−i, does not
approximate the true incentive compatibility approximation factor, as summarized below:
Bad event 1. For some mechanism M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
> max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ), (10)
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
By Lemma 3.4, we also know that with probability at most δ, we cannot approximate Equa-
tion (10) by discretizing the agent’s type space, as summarized by the following bad event:
Bad event 2. For some mechanism M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
> max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN . (11)
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Mechanism(s) Upper bound on estimation error |γˆ − γ|
based on dispersion
First-price single-item auction O˜
(
κ−1+n√
N
)
First-price combinatorial auction over ` items O˜
(
κ−1+(n+1)2`
√
`√
N
)
Generalized second-price auction O˜
(
κ−1+n3/2√
N
)
Discriminatory auction over m units of a
single good
O˜
(
κ−1+nm2√
N
)
Uniform-price auction over m units of a single
good
O˜
(
κ−1+nm2√
N
)
Second-price auction with spiteful bidders O˜
(
κ−1+n√
N
)
Table 1: Our estimation error upper bounds based on dispersion. The value κ is defined such that
[0, κ] contains the range of the density functions defining the agents’ type distribution.
With probability 1−2δ, neither bad event occurs, so Equation (11) approximates Equation (10).
In Appendix C, we show that if, given a set of samples S−i, one can measure the dispersion
parameters Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that Conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 3.5 hold, then the theorem’s
inequality holds.
We conclude with one final comparison of the greedy approach in Section 3.1.1 and the uniform
grid approach in this section. In Section 3.1.1, we use the functional form of the utility functions
in order to bound the cover size, as quantified by pseudo-dimension. When we use the approach
based on dispersion, we do not use these functional forms to the fullest extent possible; we only
use simple facts about the functions’ discontinuities and Lipschitzness.
3.2 Dispersion and pseudo-dimension guarantees
We now provide dispersion and pseudo-dimension guarantees for a variety of mechanism classes.
The theorems in this section allow us to instantiate the bounds from the previous section and thus
understand how well our empirical incentive compatibility approximation factor matches the true
approximation factor. We summarize our guarantees in Table 1.
Given an agent i ∈ [n], a true type θi ∈ [0, 1]m, and a set of samples θ(1)−i , . . . ,θ(N)−i ∼ D−i,
we often find that the discontinuities of each function ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(j)−i
)
are highly dependent on
the vector θ
(j)
−i . For example, under the first-price single-item auction, the discontinuities of the
function ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(j)−i
)
occur when θˆi =
∥∥∥θ(j)−i ∥∥∥∞. Since each vector θ(j)−i is a random draw
from the distribution D−i, these functions will not be dispersed if these random draws are highly-
concentrated. For this reason, we focus on type distributions with κ-bounded density functions. A
density function φ : R → R is κ-bounded if max{φ(x)} ≤ κ. For example, the density function of
any normal distribution with standard deviation σ ∈ R is 1
σ
√
2pi
-bounded.
The challenge we face in this section is that it is not enough to show that for some θi ∈ [0, 1]m,
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the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are dispersed. Rather, we must prove that for
all type vectors, the dispersion property holds. This facet of our analysis is notably different from
prior work by Balcan et al. [2018a]: in their applications, it is enough to show that with high
probability, a single, finite sequence of functions is dispersed. In contrast, we show that under mild
assumptions, with high probability, each function sequence from an infinite family is dispersed.
In a bit more detail, there are two types of sequences we must prove are dispersed. The first
are defined by functions over reported types θˆi, with one sequence for each true type θi; the
second are defined by functions over true types θi with one sequence for each reported type θˆi. In
other words, sequences of the first type have the form ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
and
sequences of the second type have the form ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
. For the first
family of sequences, we show that discontinuities occur only when agent i’s shift in her reported
type causes the allocation to change. These change-points have nothing to do with the true type
θi (which the mechanism does not see), so all the sequences have the same discontinuities (see, for
example in Lemma 3.6). As a result, it is enough prove dispersion for a single generic sequence,
defined by an arbitrary θi—as we do, for example, in Theorem 3.7—in order to guarantee dispersion
for all of the sequences. Throughout our applications, the second type of sequence is even simpler.
These functions have no discontinuities at all, because the allocation is invariant as we vary the
true type θi (because, again, the mechanism does not see θi). Therefore, these functions are
either constant if the player was not allocated anything, or linear otherwise (see, for example,
Theorem 3.8). As a result, all sequences from this second family are immediately dispersed.
3.2.1 First-price single-item auction
To develop intuition, we begin by analyzing the first-price auction for a single item. We then analyze
the first-price combinatorial auction in Section 3.2.2. Under this auction, each agent i ∈ [n] has a
value θi ∈ [0, 1] for the item and submits a bid θˆi ∈ [0, 1]. The agent with the highest bid wins the
item and pays his bid. Therefore, agent i’s utility function is ui,M
(
θ, θˆ
)
= 1{θˆi>‖θˆ−i‖∞}
(
θi − θˆi
)
.
To prove our dispersion guarantees, we begin with the following helpful lemma.
Lemma 3.6. For any agent i ∈ [n], any set S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, and any type θi ∈ [0, 1], the
functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and their discontinuities
fall in the set
{∥∥∥θ(j)−i ∥∥∥∞}j∈[N ].
Proof. Suppose i = 1 and choose an arbitrary sample j ∈ [N ]. For any value θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and bid
θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1], we know that u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
= 1{
θˆ1>
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞}
(
θ1 − θˆ1
)
, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Therefore, no matter the value of θ1, the function u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
is piecewise 1-Lipschitz with a
discontinuity at
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞.
We now use Lemma 3.6 to prove our first dispersion guarantee. The full proof is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose each agent’s type has a κ-bounded density function. With probability 1− δ
over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n] and
types θi ∈ [0, 1], the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
n
√
N
))
-dispersed.
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(a) The function u1,M
(
1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
. (b) The function u1,M
(
1
2 , ·,θ(j)−1
)
.
Figure 2: Agent 1’s utility function under a first-price single-item auction when the other
agents’ values and bids are defined by θ
(j)
−1 ∈ [0, 1]n−1. The utility is u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
=
1{
θˆ1>
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞}
(
θ1 − θˆ1
)
.
Proof sketch. Based on Lemma 3.6, in order to prove the theorem, it is enough to show that with
probability 1− δ/n, any interval of width O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
contains at most O˜
(
n
√
N
)
points from
the set
{∥∥∥θ(j)−i ∥∥∥∞}j∈[N ]. We do so by relying on the κ-bounded assumption, which allows us to
analyze the concentration of the discontinuities within any interval.
Theorem 3.8. For all agents i ∈ [n], reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1], and type profiles θ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1,
the function ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof. Since the reported types
(
θˆi,θ−i
)
are fixed, the allocation is fixed. Thus, ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is either a constant function if θˆi ≤ ‖θ−i‖∞ or a linear function if θˆi > ‖θ−i‖∞.
Next, we prove the following pseudo-dimension bound. The full proof is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.9. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is 2.
Proof sketch. First, we prove Pdim (Fi,M ) ≤ 2. For a contradiction, suppose there exists a set
S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i ,θ
(2)
−i ,θ
(3)
−i
}
that is shattered by Fi,M . Without loss of generality, assume
∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞ <∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ < ∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞. Since S−i is shatterable, there exist z(1), z(2), z(3) ∈ R witnessing the shatter-
ing.
We split the proof into two cases: z(3) > 0 or z(3) ≤ 0. In this sketch, we analyze the former case.
Since S−i is shatterable, there is a value θi ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆi ∈ [0, 1] such that ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
≥
z(1), ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(2)
−i
)
< z(2), and ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3). Since ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3) > 0
and ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
= 0 if
∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ ≥ θˆi, it must be that θˆi > ∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞.
Therefore, θi− θˆi ≥ z(1) and θi− θˆi < z(2), so z(1) < z(2). Similarly, there must also be θ′i ∈ [0, 1] and
θˆ′i ∈ [0, 1] such that ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(1)
−i
)
< z(1), ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(2)
−i
)
≥ z(2), and ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3).
By a similar argument, this means z(1) > z(2), which is a contradiction. We prove that in the case
where z(3) ≤ 0, we also arrive at a contradiction. Therefore, Pdim (Fi,M ) ≤ 2. Furthermore, we
exhibit a set of size 2 that is shattered by Fi,M , which means that Pdim (Fi,M ) ≥ 2. Therefore, the
theorem statement holds.
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3.2.2 First-price combinatorial auction
Under this auction, there are ` items for sale and each agent’s type θi ∈ [0, 1]2` indicates his value
for each bundle b ⊆ [`]. We denote his value and bid for bundle b as θi(b) and θˆi(b), respectively.
The allocation (b∗1, . . . , b∗n) is the solution to the winner determination problem:
maximize
∑n
i=1 θˆi (bi)
subject to bi ∩ bi′ = ∅ ∀i, i′ ∈ [n], i 6= i′.
Each agent i ∈ [n] pays θˆi (b∗i ).
We begin with dispersion guarantees. The full proof of the following theorem is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose that for each pair of agents i, i′ ∈ [n] and each pair of bundles b, b′ ⊆ [`],
the values θi(b) and θi′(b
′) have a κ-bounded joint density function. With probability 1 − δ over
the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n] and
types θi ∈ [0, 1]2`, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz
and
(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
(n+ 1)2`
√
N`
))
-dispersed.
Proof sketch. Consider agent 1. Fix an arbitrary sample j ∈ [N ] and pair of allocations (b1, . . . , bn)
and (b′1, . . . , b′n). We know that (b′1, . . . , b′n) will not be the allocation so long as θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1]2
`
is chosen
such that θˆ1(b1) +
∑n
i=2 θ
(j)
i (bi) > θˆ1(b
′
1) +
∑n
i=2 θ
(j)
i (b
′
i). This means that across all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]2
`
,
there is a fixed set Hj of
(
(n+1)`
2
)
hyperplanes (one per pair of allocations) such that for any
connected component C of [0, 1]2
` \ Hj , the allocation given bids
(
θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
is invariant across all
θˆ1 ∈ C. When the allocation is fixed, agent 1’s utility is 1-Lipschitz as a function of θˆ1.
Next, consider the set S−1 =
{
θ
(1)
−1, . . . ,θ
(N)
−1
}
of type profiles and the corresponding sets
H1, . . . ,HN of hyperplanes. These hyperplanes can be partitioned into
(
(n+1)`
2
)
buckets consisting
of parallel hyperplanes with offsets independently drawn from κ-bounded distributions. Within
each bucket, the offsets are (w′, k′)-dispersed with high probability with w′ = O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
and
k′ = O˜
(√
N`
)
. Since the hyperplanes within each bucket are parallel and since their offsets are
dispersed, for any ball B of radius w′ in [0, 1]2` , at most k′ hyperplanes from each set intersect B.
The theorem statement holds by a union bound over the n agents and
(
(n+1)`
2
)
buckets.
Theorem 3.11. For all agents i ∈ [n], reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1]2`, and type profiles θ−i ∈
[0, 1](n−1)2`, the function ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof. So long as all bids are fixed, the allocation is fixed, so ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Next, we prove the following pseudo-dimension bound.
Theorem 3.12. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is O
(
`2` log n
)
.
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Theorem 3.10, for any type profile θ−i ∈ [0, 1](n−1)2` , there is
a set H of (n + 1)2` hyperplanes such that for any connected component C of [0, 1]2` \ H, the
auction’s allocation given bids
(
θˆi,θ−i
)
is invariant across all θˆi ∈ C. So long as the allocation is
fixed, ui,M (·, ·,θ−i) is a linear function of
(
θi, θˆi
)
. Therefore, the pseudo-dimension bound follows
from Theorem B.1 in Appendix B, which relates the class’s pseudo-dimension to the number of
hyperplanes splitting the type space into regions where the utility function is linear.
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3.2.3 Generalized second-price auction
A generalized second-price auction allocates m advertising slots to a set of n > m agents. Each
slot s has a probability αs,i of being clicked if agent i’s advertisement is in that slot. We assume
αs,i is fixed and known by the mechanism designer. The mechanism designer assigns a weight
ωi ∈ (0, 1] per agent i. Each agent has a value θi ∈ [0, 1] for a click and submits a bid θˆi ∈
[0, 1]. The mechanism allocates the first slot to the agent with the highest weighted bid ωiθˆi, the
second slot to the agent with the second highest weighted bid, and so on. Let pi(s) be the agent
allocated slot s. If slot s is clicked on, agent pi(s) pays the lowest amount that would have given
him slot s, which is ωpi(s+1)θˆpi(s+1)/ωpi(s). Agent pi(s)’s expected utility is thus upi(s),M
(
θ, θˆ
)
=
αs,pi(s)
(
θpi(s) − ωpi(s+1)θˆpi(s+1)/ωpi(s)
)
.
For r ∈ Z≥1, letMr be the set of auctions defined by agent weights from the set {1/r, 2/r, . . . , 1}.
We begin by proving dispersion guarantees. The full proof is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.13. Suppose each agent’s type has a κ-bounded density function. With probability
1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n],
types θi ∈ [0, 1], and mechanisms M ∈ Mr, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 0-Lipschitz and
(
O
(
1/
(
rκ
√
N
))
, O˜
(√
n3N
))
-dispersed.
Proof sketch. Consider agent 1. Choose an arbitrary sample j ∈ [N ] and mechanism M ∈ Mr
with weights ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn). Let ωi1θ
(j)
i1
≤ · · · ≤ ωin−1θ(j)in−1 be the weighted types of all agents
except agent 1. Consider the n intervals delineated by these n− 1 weighted values and suppose we
vary θˆ1 in such a way that ω1θˆ1 remains within one interval. The allocation will be invariant, so
agent 1’s utility will be a constant function of θˆ1. Therefore, no matter the value of θ1 ∈ [0, 1], the
functions u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are piecewise constant with discontinuities in the
set B1,ω =
{
ωiθ
(j)
i /ω1 : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, j ∈ [N ]
}
. We use the κ-bounded assumption to show that
with probability 1− δ, for all ω and agents i ∈ [n], at most O˜
(
n3/2
√
N
)
of the values in each set
Bi,ω fall within any interval of length O
(
1/
(
rκ
√
N
))
.
Theorem 3.14. For all agents i ∈ [n], all reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1], all type profiles θ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1,
and all generalized second-price auctions M , the function ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof. Since the reported types
(
θˆi,θ−i
)
are fixed, the allocation is fixed. Let pi(s) be the agent
who is allocated slot s. The function ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
is either a constant function of θi if agent i
is not allocated a slot or a linear function of θi with a slope of αpi−1(i),i otherwise.
We now provide the following pseudo-dimension guarantee. The full proof is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.15. For any agent i ∈ [n] and r ∈ Z≥1, Pdim (Fi,Mr) = O (n log n) .
Proof sketch. Suppose i = 1. Fix θ−1 = (θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ [0, 1]n−1. We denote agent 1’s util-
ity when the agents’ true types are (θ1,θ−1) and reported types are
(
θˆ1,θ−1
)
as the function
uθ−1
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
, which maps Rn+2 to [−1, 1]. We show that we can split Rn+2 into regions
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where the allocation is fixed as we vary
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
over any one region. When the allo-
cation is fixed, uθ−1 is a linear function of (θ1, ω2/ω1, . . . , ωn/ω1). We prove that this partition of
Rn+2 is delineated by a small number of polynomials of degree at most 2 over these n+ 2 variables.
This fact allows us to bound the number of regions making up the partition. Since the utility
function is simple within each region, we use our bound on the number of regions to prove the
theorem.
3.2.4 Discriminatory auction
Under the discriminatory auction, there are m identical units of a single item for sale. For each
agent i ∈ [n], his type θi ∈ [0, 1]m indicates how much he is willing to pay for each additional unit.
Thus, θi[1] is the amount he is willing to pay for one unit, θi[1] + θi[2] is the amount he is willing to
pay for two units, and so on. We assume that θi[1] ≥ θi[2] ≥ · · · ≥ θi[m]. The auctioneer collects
nm bids θˆi[µ] for i ∈ [n] and µ ∈ [m]. If exactly mi of agent i’s bids are among the m highest of
all nm bids, then agent i is awarded mi units and pays
∑mi
µ=1 θˆi[µ].
We begin with dispersion guarantees. The full proof of the following theorem is in Appendix D.
Theorem 3.16. Suppose that each agent’s value for each marginal unit has a κ-bounded density
function. With probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for
all agents i ∈ [n] and types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are
piecewise 1-Lipschitz and
(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
nm2
√
N
))
-dispersed.
Proof sketch. Consider agent 1 and suppose we sort
{
θ
(j)
i [µ] : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, j ∈ [N ], µ ∈ [m]
}
. So
long as agent 1’s bid falls between these sorted bids, the allocations will be fixed across all j ∈ [N ],
and thus each u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
is 1-Lipschitz. Across all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]m, the partition Pj splitting
u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
into Lipschitz portions is delineated by the set of hyperplanes{
θ
(j)
i [µ]− θˆ1[µ′] = 0 : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, µ, µ′ ∈ [m]
}
.
We partition these hyperplanes into m2(n−1) buckets consisting of parallel hyperplanes with offsets
independently drawn from κ-bounded distributions. The remainder of the proof is similar to that
of Theorem 3.10.
Theorem 3.17. For all agents i ∈ [n], reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, and type profiles θ−i ∈
[0, 1](n−1)m, the function ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof. So long as all bids are fixed, the allocation is fixed, so ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Next, we prove the following pseudo-dimension bound.
Theorem 3.18. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is O (m log(nm)).
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Theorem 3.16, for any θ−i ∈ [0, 1](n−1)m, there is a set H of
O
(
m2n
)
hyperplanes such that for any connected component C of [0, 1]m\H, the allocation is fixed
across all θˆi ∈ C. So long as the allocation is fixed, ui,M (·, ·,θ−i) is a linear function of
(
θi, θˆi
)
.
Therefore, the pseudo-dimension bound follows directly from Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.
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Figure 3: Graph of u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
for a spiteful agent under a second-price auction with α1 =
θ1 =
1
2 , ‖θ−1‖∞ = 34 , and s(j) = 14 .
3.2.5 Uniform-price auction
Under this auction, the allocation rule is the same as in the discriminatory auction (Section 3.2.4).
However, all m units are sold at a “market-clearing” price, meaning the total amount demanded
equals the total amount supplied. See the formal definition in Appendix D.1. We obtain the same
bounds as we do in Section 3.2.4, so we state the theorems in Appendix D.1.
3.2.6 Second-price auction with spiteful agents
We conclude by studying spiteful agents [Brandt et al., 2007, Morgan et al., 2003, Sharma and
Sandholm, 2010, Tang and Sandholm, 2012], where each bidder’s utility not only increases when
his surplus increases, but also decreases when the other bidders’ surpluses increase. Formally, given
a spite parameter αi ∈ [0, 1], agent i’s utility under the second-price auction M is ui,M
(
θ, θˆ
)
=
αi1{θˆi>‖θˆ−i‖∞}
(
θi −
∥∥∥θˆ−i∥∥∥∞)−(1− αi)∑i′ 6=i 1{θˆi′>‖θˆ−i′‖∞} (θi′ −
∥∥∥θˆ−i′∥∥∥∞) . The closer αi is to
zero, the more spiteful bidder i is.
We begin with the following lemma, which follows from the form of u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
(see Fig-
ure 3). The proof is in Appendix D.
Lemma 3.19. For any agent i ∈ [n], any S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, and any type θi ∈ [0, 1], the
functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and their discontinuities
fall in the set
{∥∥∥θ(j)−i ∥∥∥∞}j∈[N ].
Lemma 3.19 implies the following dispersion guarantee.
Theorem 3.20. Suppose each agent’s type has a κ-bounded density function. With probability 1−δ
over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n] and
types θi ∈ [0, 1], the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
n
√
N
))
-dispersed.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.19 exactly as Theorem 3.7 follows from Lemma 3.6.
Theorem 3.21. For all agents i ∈ [n], reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1], and type profiles θ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1,
the function ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
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Proof. Since the reported types
(
θˆi,θ−i
)
are fixed, the allocation is fixed. If θˆi > ‖θ−i‖∞, then
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
= αi (θi − ‖θ−i‖∞), which is an αi-Lipschitz function of θi. Otherwise, it is a
constant function of θi.
We conclude with the following pseudo-dimension bound.
Theorem 3.22. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is O(1).
Proof. For any vector θ−i ∈ [0, 1](n−1), let s be the second-highest component. Letting H = {θˆi =
‖θ−i‖∞ , θˆi = s} we know that for any interval I of [0, 1] \ H, the allocation is fixed across all
θˆi ∈ C. So long as the allocation is fixed, ui,M (·, ·,θ−i) is a linear function of
(
θi, θˆi
)
. Therefore,
the pseudo-dimension bound follows directly from Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from ex-interim
and ex-ante incentive compatible. We introduced an empirical variant of approximate incentive
compatibility which intuitively measures the maximum utility an agent can gain by misreporting
his type, on average over the samples. We bounded the difference between our empirical incentive
compatibility estimate and the true incentive compatibility approximation factor. To do so, we
relied on a subtle mixture of tools from learning theory, including dispersion and pseudo-dimension.
We thus derived strong guarantees for many important manipulable mechanisms, including the first-
price auction, generalized second-price auction, discriminatory auction, uniform price auction, and
second-price auction under spiteful agents.
As in prior research on auction design via machine learning, we assumed that we could receive
independent samples from the type distribution. One direction for future work would be to relax
this assumption in the spirit of incentive-aware learning [Epasto et al., 2018]. Another would be
to relax the assumption that each agent’s type is independent from the others’ in the ex-interim
setting.
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A Helpful lemmas
Lemma A.1 (Anthony and Bartlett [2009]). Suppose f1, . . . , fp are polynomials of degree at most
d in v ≤ p variables. Then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

sign (f1(x))...
sign (fp(x))
 : x ∈ Rv

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
(
2epd
v
)v
.
Lemma A.2 (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [2014]). Let α ≥ 1 and β > 0. If x < α log x + β,
then x < 4α log(2α) + 2β.
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A.1 Dispersion lemmas
We now include a few lemmas about dispersion from work by Balcan et al. [2018a] as well as a few
variations we prove ourselves for our specific applications.
Lemma A.3 (Balcan et al. [2018a]). Let B = {β1, . . . , βr} ⊂ R be a collection of samples where
each βi is drawn from a distribution with a κ-bounded density function. For any δ ≥ 0, the following
statements hold with probability at least 1− δ:
1. If the βi are independent, then every interval of width w contains at most k = O(rwκ +√
r log(1/δ)) samples. In particular, for any α ≥ 1/2 we can take w = 1/(κr1−α) and
k = O(rα
√
log(1/δ)).
2. If the samples can be partitioned into P buckets B1, . . . ,BP such that each Bi contains in-
dependent samples and |Bi| ≤ M , then every interval of width w contains at most k =
O(PMwκ+
√
M log(P/δ). In particular, for any α ≥ 1/2 we can take w = 1/(κM1−α) and
k = O(PMα
√
log(P/δ)).
Lemma A.4 (Balcan et al. [2018a]). Suppose X is a random variable with κ-bounded density
function and suppose c 6= 0 is a constant. Then cX has a κ|c| -bounded density function.
Lemma A.5. Suppose X and Y are random variables taking values in [0, 1] and suppose that their
joint distribution has a κ-bounded density function. Then the distribution of X+Z has a κ-bounded
density function.
Proof. Let Z = X +Y . We will perform change of variables using the function g(x, y) = (x, x+ y).
Let g−1(x, z) = h(x, z) = (x, z − x). Then
Jh(x, z) = det
(
1 0
−1 1
)
= 1.
Therefore, fX,Z(x, z) = fX,Y (x, z − x). This means that fZ(z) =
∫ 1
0 fX,Y (x, z − x) dx ≤ κ, so the
theorem statement holds.
Lemma A.6. Suppose X and Y are random variables taking values in [0, 1] and suppose that their
joint distribution has a κ-bounded density function. Then the distribution of X−Z has a κ-bounded
density function.
Proof. Let Z = X −Y . We will perform change of variables using the function g(x, y) = (x, x− y).
Let g−1(x, z) = h(x, z) = (x, x− z). Then
Jh(x, z) = det
(
1 0
1 −1
)
= −1.
Therefore, fX,Z(x, z) = fX,Y (x, x− z). This means that fZ(z) =
∫ 1
0 fX,Z(x, z) dx =
∫ 1
0 fX,Y (x, x−
z) dx ≤ κ, so the theorem statement holds.
Definition A.1 (Hyperplane delineation). Let Ψ be a set of hyperplanes in Rm and let P be a
partition of a set Rm. Let K1, . . . ,Kq be the connected components of Rm \Ψ. Suppose every set
in P is the union of some collection of sets Ki1 , . . . ,Kij together with their limit points. Then we
say that the set Ψ delineates P.
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Lemma A.7 (Balcan et al. [2018a]). Let u1, . . . , uN be a set of piecewise L-Lipschitz functions
mapping Rm to R, drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D. For each j ∈ [N ], let Pj be the partition
of [0, 1]m such that over any R ∈ Pj, uj is L-Lipschitz. Suppose the hyperplane sets Ψ1, . . . ,ΨN
delineate the partitions P1, . . . ,PN . Moreover, suppose the multi-set union of Ψ1, . . . ,ΨN can be
partitioned into P multi-sets B1, . . . ,BP such that for each multi-set Bi:
1. The hyperplanes in Bi are parallel with probability 1 over the draw of u1, . . . , uN .
2. The offsets of the hyperplanes in Bi are independently drawn from κ-bounded distributions.
With probability at least 1− δ over the draw of u1, . . . , uN , the functions are(
1
2κ
√
max |Bi|
, O
(
P
√
max |Bi| ln P
δ
))
-dispersed.
B Delineable utility functions
To prove some of our pseudo-dimension guarantees, we use the notion of delineability introduced
by Balcan et al. [2018b]. They used it in the context of profit-maximization, so here we adapt it
to our setting.
Given a mechanism M and agent i ∈ [n], let Fi,M =
{
ui,M,θi,θˆi
∣∣∣ θi, θˆi ∈ Θi}, where ui,M,θi,θˆi
is the function introduced in Section 3. Moreover, for a fixed type profile θ−i ∈ ×j 6=iΘj , let
uθ−i : Θ
2
i → [−1, 1] be a function that maps a pair of types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi to ui,M,θi,θˆi (θ−i).
Definition B.1 ((m, t)-delineable). Given a mechanism M and agent i ∈ [n], we say the function
class Fi,M is (m, t)-delineable if:
1. Each agent’s type space is a subset of [0, 1]m; and
2. For any θ−i ∈ [0, 1]m(n−1), there is a set H of t hyperplanes such that for any connected
component C of [0, 1]2m \ H, the function uθ−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is linear over C.
The following theorem is similar to Balcan et al.’s main theorem [Balcan et al., 2018b], though
we have adapted it to our setting. We include the proof for completeness.
Theorem B.1. If Fi,M is (m, t)-delineable, the pseudo dimension of Fi,M is O (m log (mt)).
Proof. Suppose Pdim (Fi,M ) = N . By definition, there exists a set S =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
that is
shattered by Fi,M . Let z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R be the points that witness this shattering. Again, by
definition, we know that for any T ⊆ [N ], there exists a pair of types θ(T )i , θˆ(T )i ∈ [0, 1]m such that
u
i,M,θ
(T )
i ,θˆ
(T )
i
(
θ
(j)
−i
)
≥ z(j) if and only if j ∈ T . Let Θ∗ =
{(
θ
(T )
i , θˆ
(T )
i
)
: T ⊆ [N ]
}
. To show that
the pseudo-dimension N of Fi,M is O(m log(mt)), we will show that |Θ∗| = 2N < 4m2t2mN4m,
which means that N = O(m log(mt)).
To this end, for θ
(j)
−i ∈ S, let H(j) be the set of t hyperplanes such that for any connected
component C of [0, 1]2m \ H(j), u
θ
(j)
−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is linear over C. We now consider the overlay of all N
partitions [0, 1]2m \H(1), . . . , [0, 1]2m \H(N). Formally, this overlay is made up of the sets C1, . . . , Cτ
which are the connected components of [0, 1]2m \
(⋃N
j=1H(j)
)
. For each set C` and each j ∈ [N ],
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C` is completely contained in a single connected component of [0, 1]2m \ H(j), which means that
u
θ
(j)
−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is linear over C`. As we know from work by Buck [1943], since
∣∣H(j)∣∣ ≤ t for all
j ∈ [N ], τ < 2m(Nt)2m.
Now, consider a single connected component C` of [0, 1]2m \
(⋃N
j=1H(j)
)
. For any sample
θ
(j)
−i ∈ S, we know that uθ(j)−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is linear over C`. Let a(j)` ∈ R2m and b(j)` ∈ R be the
weight vector and offset such that u
θ
(j)
−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
= a
(j)
` ·
(
θi, θˆi
)
+ b
(j)
` for all
(
θi, θˆi
)
∈ C`. We
know that there is a hyperplane a
(j)
` ·
(
θi, θˆi
)
+ b
(j)
` = z
(j) where on one side of the hyperplane,
u
θ
(j)
−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
≤ z(j) and on the other side, u
θ
(j)
−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
> z(j). Let HC` be all N hyperplanes
for all N samples
(
HC` =
{
a
(j)
` ·
(
θi, θˆi
)
+ b
(j)
` = z
(j) : j ∈ [N ]
})
. Notice that in any connected
component C of C` \ HC` , for all j ∈ [N ], uθ(j)−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is either greater than z(j) or less than z(j)
(but not both) for all
(
θi, θˆi
)
∈ C. Thus, at most one vector
(
θi, θˆi
)
∈ Θ∗ can come from C. In
total, the number of connected components of C` \HC` is smaller than 2mN2m. The same holds for
every partition C`. Thus, the total number of regions where for all j ∈ [N ], uθ(j)−i
(
θi, θˆi
)
is either
greater than z(j) or less than z(j) (but not both) is smaller than 2mN2m ·2m(Nt)2m. Therefore, we
may bound |Θ∗| = 2N < 2mN2m ·2m(Nt)2m. By Lemma A.2, we have that N = O(m log(mt)).
C Proofs about approximate ex-interim incentive compatibility
(Section 3)
Theorem 3.2. With probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i,
for all mechanisms M ∈M and agents i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary agent i ∈ [n]. By Theorem 3.1, we know that with probability at least
1− δ/n over the draw of S−i, for all mechanisms M ∈M and all θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤
√
2di
N
ln
eN
di
+
√
1
2N
ln
2n
δ
and
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− Eθ−i∼D−i [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)] ≤
√
2di
N
ln
eN
di
+
√
1
2N
ln
2n
δ
.
28
Therefore,
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− Eθ−i∼D−i [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)]
= Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− Eθ−i∼D−i [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)]
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ).
Since the above inequality holds for all i ∈ [n] with probability 1− δ/n, a union bound implies
that with probability 1− δ, for all i ∈ [n] and all mechanism M ∈M,
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Theorem 3.3. Given a set S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, a mechanism M ∈M, and accuracy parameter
 > 0, let G (S−i,M, ) be the cover returned by Algorithm 1. With probability 1− δ over the draw
of the n sets S−i ∼ DN−i, for every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
(θi,θˆi)∈G(S−i,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ + O˜
(√
di
N
)
, (5)
where di = Pdim (Fi,M). Moreover, with probability 1, |G (S−i,M, )| ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di.
Proof. Let θ∗i and θˆ
∗
i be the types in Θi that maximize
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
.
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By definition of the set G (S−i,M, ), we know there exists a pair
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i
)
∈ G (S−i,M, ) such that
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ∗i , θˆ
∗
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ∗i , θ
∗
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ′i, θ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ 
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈G(S−i,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ .
Therefore, by this inequality and Theorem 3.2, we know that with probability at least 1− δ,
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
− max
(θi,θˆi)∈G(S−i,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
=Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
− max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− max
(θi,θˆi)∈G(S−i,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ + O˜
(√
di
N
)
.
The bound on |G (S−i,M, )| follows from Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.1. For any G returned by Algorithm 1, |G| ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di, where di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Proof. Let N1(, U) be the -covering number of U and let P1(, U) be the -packing number of
U . In other words, N1(, U) is the size of the smallest set V ′ ⊆ RN such that for all v ∈ U , there
is a vector v′ ∈ V ′ such that ‖v − v′‖1 ≤ , and P1(, U) is the size of the largest set P ⊆ U
such that for all v,v′ ∈ P , if v 6= v′, then ‖v − v′‖1 ≥ . As Anthony and Bartlett [2009] prove,
P(, U) ≤ N (/2, U).
By construction, for every pair of vectors v and v′ in the set V defined in Algorithm 1, we know
that ‖v − v′‖1 ≥ . Therefore, |V | ≤ P(, U) ≤ N (/2, U). In the following claim, we prove that
N (/2, U) ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di , which proves the theorem.
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Claim C.2. N (/2, U) ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di.
Proof. Let U ′ be the set of vectors
U ′ =

1
N

ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
 : θi, θˆi ∈ Θi
 .
Note that U ⊆ {v − v′ : v,v′ ∈ U ′}. We claim that N (/2, U) ≤ N (/4, U ′)2 ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di ,
where the second inequality follows from a theorem by Anthony and Bartlett [2009]. To see why the
first inequality holds, suppose C ′ is an 4 -cover of U
′ with minimal size. Let C = {c− c′ : c, c′ ∈ C ′}.
Then for all v ∈ U , we know that v = v′−v′′ for some v′,v′′ ∈ U ′. Moreover, we know that there are
vectors c′, c′′ ∈ C ′ such that ‖v′ − c′‖1 ≤ /4 and ‖v′′ − c′′‖1 ≤ /4. Therefore, ‖v − (c′ − c′′)‖1 =
‖(v′ − v′′)− (c′ − c′′)‖1 ≤ /2. Since c′ − c′′ ∈ C, we have that C is a cover of U . Therefore,
N (/2, U) ≤ |C| ≤ |C ′|2 = N (/4, U ′)2 ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di .
Lemma C.3. Let M be a class of mechanisms. For each i ∈ [n], let S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
be a
set of type profiles for all agents except agent i and let Li, ki, wi ∈ R be real values such that for
each mechanism M ∈M, the following conditions hold:
1. For any θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
2. For any θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then for all M ∈M and i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN . (12)
Proof. By definition of dispersion, we know that the following conditions hold:
Condition 1. For all mechanisms M ∈ M, all agents i ∈ [n], all types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, and all
reported types θˆi, θˆ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if
∥∥∥θˆi − θˆ′i∥∥∥
2
≤ wi, then∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θˆ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN . (13)
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Condition 2. For all mechanisms M ∈M, all agents i ∈ [n], all reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, and
all types θi,θ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if ‖θi − θ′i‖2 ≤ wi, then∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN . (14)
We claim that the inequality from the lemma statement (Equation (12)) holds so long as Con-
ditions 1 and 2 hold.
Claim C.4. If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, then for all M ∈M and i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN .
Proof of Claim C.4. Fix an agent i ∈ [n] and let θi and θˆi be two fixed, arbitrary vectors in [0, 1]m.
By definition of Gw, there must be a point p ∈ Gw such that ‖θi − p‖1 ≤ wi. By Equation (13),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,p,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN
and by Equation (14),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi,p,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
p,p,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN .
Similarly, there must be a point pˆ ∈ Gw such that
∥∥∥pˆ− θˆi∥∥∥
1
≤ wi. By Equation (13),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN
and by Equation (14),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
p, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN .
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Therefore, ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,p,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi,p,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
p,p,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
p,p,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
p, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
p, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
p,p,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
p, pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 4Liwi + 8kiN .
Since p, pˆ ∈ Gwi , the claim holds.
The lemma thus follows from Claim C.4.
Theorem C.5. Let M be a mechanism class. Given n sets of samples S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼
DN−i, for each i ∈ [n] let Li, ki, wi ∈ R be defined such that for each M ∈M, the following conditions
hold:
1. For any θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
2. For any θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then with probability 1− δ, for every M ∈M, every agent i ∈ [n], and every pair θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN + M(N, δ)
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
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Proof. From Theorem 3.2, we know that with probability 1− δ, for every mechanism M ∈M and
every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ).
Moreover, from Lemma C.3, we know that the following inequality holds:
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN .
Therefore, with probability 1− δ, for every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
= max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
− max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN + M(N, δ).
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with probability
1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for each mechanism M ∈ M and
agent i ∈ [n], the following conditions hold:
1. For any type θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise
Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
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2. For any reported type θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are
piecewise Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then with probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i ∼ DN−i, for all mechanisms M ∈M and
agents i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN . (8)
Proof. By definition of dispersion, we know that with probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets
S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, the following conditions hold:
Condition 1. For all mechanisms M ∈ M, all agents i ∈ [n], all types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, and all
reported types θˆi, θˆ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if
∥∥∥θˆi − θˆ′i∥∥∥
1
≤ wi, then∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi, θˆ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN . (15)
Condition 2. For all mechanisms M ∈M, all agents i ∈ [n], all reported types θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, and
all types θi,θ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if ‖θi − θ′i‖1 ≤ wi, then∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN . (16)
From Claim C.4, we know that Equation (8) holds so long as Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Since
Conditions 1 and 2 hold with probability 1− δ, the lemma statement holds.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with
probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for each mechanism
M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n], the following conditions hold:
1. For any θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
2. For any θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise Li-
Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed.
Then with probability 1− 2δ, for every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ ,
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where  = 4Liwi +
8ki
N + 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
Proof. Theorem 3.2 guarantees that with probability at most δ, the extent to which any agent i can
improve his utility by misreporting his type, averaged over all profiles in S−i, does not approximate
the true incentive compatibility approximation factor, as summarized below:
Bad event 1. For some mechanism M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
> max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
By Lemma 3.4, we also know that with probability at most δ, we cannot approximate Equa-
tion (10) by discretizing the agent’s type space, as summarized by the following bad event:
Bad event 2. For some mechanism M ∈M and agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)
> max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ 4Liwi + 8kiN .
By a union bound, the probability that either Bad Event 1 or Bad Event 2 occurs is at most 2δ.
Therefore, the probability that neither occurs is at least 1 − 2δ. If neither occurs, then for every
mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θi,θˆi∈[0,1]m
{
Eθ−i∼D−i
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θi,θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θi,θi,θ
(j)
−i
)+ ,
where  = 4Liwi +
4ki
N + 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim (Fi,M).
D Proofs about dispersion and pseudo-dimension (Section 3.2)
Theorem 3.7. Suppose each agent’s type has a κ-bounded density function. With probability 1− δ
over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n] and
types θi ∈ [0, 1], the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
n
√
N
))
-dispersed.
36
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder, and without loss of generality, suppose that bidder is bidder 1.
Next, choose an arbitrary sample θ
(j)
−1 =
(
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
)
. For any value θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1],
we know that u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
= 1{
θˆ1>
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞}
(
θ1 − θˆ1
)
, as illustrated in Figure 2. Therefore,
if θˆ1 ≤
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞, then u1,M (θ1, θˆ1,θ(j)−1) is a constant function of θˆ1, whereas if θˆ1 > ∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞, then
u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
is a linear function of θˆ1 with a slope of −1. Therefore, for all θi ∈ [0, 1], the
function u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
is piecewise 1-Lipschitz with a discontinuity at
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞.
We now prove that with probability 1− δn , for all θ1 ∈ [0, 1], the functions
u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are (w, k)-dispersed. Since for any θ1 ∈ [0, 1] the function u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
will only have a
discontinuity at a point in the set
{
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
}
, it is enough to prove that with probability 1− δn ,
at most k points in the set B = ⋃Nj=1 {θ(j)2 , . . . , θ(j)n } fall within any interval of width w. The
theorem statement then holds by a union bound over all n bidders.
Claim D.1. With probability 1 − δn , at most k points in the set
⋃N
j=1
{
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
}
fall within
any interval of width w.
Proof of Claim D.1. For i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let Bi =
{
θ
(j)
i
}
j∈[N ]
. The claim follows from Lemma A.3
in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.9. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is 2.
Proof. First, we prove that Pdim (Fi,M ) ≤ 2.
Claim D.2. The pseudo-dimension of Fi,M is at most 2.
Proof of Claim D.2. For a contradiction, suppose there exists a set S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i ,θ
(2)
−i ,θ
(3)
−i
}
that is
shattered by Fi,M . Without loss of generality, assume that
∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞ < ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ < ∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞. Since
S−i is shatterable, there exists three values z(1), z(2), z(3) ∈ R that witness the shattering of S−i by
Fi,M . We split the proof into two cases: one where z(3) > 0 and one where z(3) ≤ 0.
Case 1: z(3) > 0. Since S−i is shatterable, there is a value θi ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆi ∈ [0, 1] such
that ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
≥ z(1), ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(2)
−i
)
< z(2), and ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3). Recall that for
any θ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
= 1{θˆi>‖θ−i‖∞}
(
θi − θˆi
)
. Since ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3) > 0,
it must be that θˆi >
∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞. Therefore, θi − θˆi ≥ z(1) and θi − θˆi < z(2),
which means that z(1) < z(2).
Next, there must also be a value θ′i ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆ′i ∈ [0, 1] such that ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(1)
−i
)
< z(1),
ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(2)
−i
)
≥ z(2), and ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3). Again, since ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(3)
−i
)
≥ z(3) > 0,
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θi θˆi ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(2)
−i
)
1 1 0 0
7/8 1/8 1/8
3/4 1/4 1/4
1/2 1/2 0
Table 2: Shattering of the example from Claim D.3.
it must be that θˆ′i >
∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞. Therefore, θ′i − θˆ′i < z(1) and θ′i − θˆ′i ≥ z(2),
which means that z(2) > z(1), which is a contradiction.
Case 2: z(3) ≤ 0. Since S−i is shatterable, there is a value θi ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆi ∈ [0, 1]
such that ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
≥ z(1), ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(2)
−i
)
< z(2), and ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
< z(3). Since
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ
(3)
−i
)
< z(3) ≤ 0, it must be that θˆi >
∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞. Therefore,
θi − θˆi ≥ z(1) and θi − θˆi < z(2), which means that z(1) < z(2).
Next, there must also be a value θ′i ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆ′i ∈ [0, 1] such that ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(1)
−i
)
< z(1),
ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(2)
−i
)
≥ z(2), and ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(3)
−i
)
< z(3). Again, since ui,M
(
θ′i, θˆ
′
i,θ
(3)
−i
)
< z(3) ≤ 0,
it must be that θˆ′i >
∥∥∥θ(3)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ > ∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞. Therefore, θ′i − θˆ′i < z(1) and θ′i − θˆ′i ≥ z(2),
which means that z(2) > z(1), which is a contradiction.
Since we arrive at a contradiction in both cases, we conclude that Pdim (Fi,M ) ≤ 2.
We now prove that Pdim (Fi,M ) ≥ 2.
Claim D.3. The pseudo-dimension of Fi,M is at least 2.
Proof of Claim D.3. To prove this claim, we exhibit a set of size 2 that is shattered by Fi,M . Let
θ
(1)
−i and θ
(2)
−i be two sets of values such that
∥∥∥θ(1)−i ∥∥∥∞ = 1/3 and ∥∥∥θ(2)−i ∥∥∥∞ = 2/3. Table 2 illustrates
that z(1) = 3/16 and z(2) = 1/16 witness the shattering of
{
θ
(1)
−i ,θ
(2)
−i
}
by Fi,M .
Together, Claims D.2 and D.3 prove that Pdim (Fi,M ) = 2.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose that for each pair of agents i, i′ ∈ [n] and each pair of bundles b, b′ ⊆ [`],
the values θi(b) and θi′(b
′) have a κ-bounded joint density function. With probability 1 − δ over
the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n] and
types θi ∈ [0, 1]2`, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz
and
(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
(n+ 1)2`
√
N`
))
-dispersed.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary agent, and without loss of generality, suppose that agent is agent 1. Next,
fix an arbitrary sample θ
(j)
−1 and pair of allocations (b1, . . . , bn) and (b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n). We know that
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(b′1, . . . , b′n) will not be the allocation of the first-price combinatorial auction so long as agent 1’s
reported type θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1]2` is chosen such that
θˆ1(b1) +
n∑
i=2
θ
(j)
i (bi) > θˆ1(b
′
1) +
n∑
i=2
θ
(j)
i (b
′
i).
This means that across all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]2` , there is fixed a set Ψj of
(
(n+1)`
2
)
hyperplanes (one per
pair of allocations) such that for any connected component C of [0, 1]2
` \Ψj , the allocation of the
first-price combinatorial auction is invariant across all θˆ1 ∈ C. Namely,
Ψj =
{
θˆ1(b1)− θˆ1(b′1) =
n∑
i=2
θ
(j)
i (b
′
i)− θ(j)i (bi) : (b1, . . . , bn) and
(
b′1, . . . , b
′
n
)
are allocations
}
.
So long as the allocation is fixed, agent 1’s utility is 1-Lipschitz in θˆ1.
For each pair of allocations b = (b1, . . . , bn) and b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b′n), let
Bb,b′ =
{
θˆ1(b1)− θˆ1(b′1) =
n∑
i=2
θ
(j)
i (b
′
i)− θ(j)i (bi) : j ∈ [N ]
}
.
Within each set, the hyperplanes are parallel with probability 1. By Lemmas A.5 and A.6 in
Appendix A.1, their offsets are independently drawn from distributions with κ-bounded density
functions. Therefore, by Lemma A.7 in Appendix A.1, with probability 1− δn , for all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]2
`
,
the functions u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are (w, k)-dispersed with w = O
(
1
κ
√
N
)
and
k = O
(
(n+ 1)2`
√
N log n(n+1)
2`
δ
)
. The theorem statement holds by a union bound over all n
agents.
Theorem 3.13. Suppose each agent’s type has a κ-bounded density function. With probability
1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have that for all agents i ∈ [n],
types θi ∈ [0, 1], and mechanisms M ∈ Mr, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 0-Lipschitz and
(
O
(
1/
(
rκ
√
N
))
, O˜
(√
n3N
))
-dispersed.
Proof. Let w = O
(
1
rκ
√
N
)
and k = O
(
n3/2
√
N log nrδ
)
. Consider an arbitrary agent, and with-
out loss of generality, suppose that agent is agent 1. Next, choose an arbitrary sample θ
(j)
−1 =(
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
)
and mechanism M ∈ Mr with agent weights ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈
{
1
r ,
2
r , . . . , 1
}n
.
Let ωi1θ
(j)
i1
≤ · · · ≤ ωin−1θ(j)in−1 be the weighted types of all agents except agent 1. Consider the n
intervals delineated by these n− 1 weighted values: I1 =
[
0, ωi1θ
(j)
i1
)
, . . . , In =
[
ωin−1θ
(j)
in−1 , 1
]
with
Iτ =
[
ωiτ−1θ
(j)
iτ−1 , ωiτ θ
(j)
iτ
)
.
Suppose we vary θˆ1 in such a way that ω1θˆ1 remains within a single interval Iτ . Said another way,
consider varying θˆ1 over the interval ωiτ−1θ(j)iτ−1
ω1
,
ωiτ θ
(j)
iτ
ω1
 .
39
The allocation will be constant, which means agent 1’s utility will be a constant function of θˆ1.
Therefore, no matter the value of θ1, u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are piecewise constant
with discontinuities in the set
B1,ω =
{
ωi′θ
(j)
i′
ω1
: i′ ∈ {2, . . . , n}, j ∈ [N ]
}
.
This means that in order to prove the theorem, it is enough to show that with probability 1 − δ,
for all ω ∈ {1r , 2r , . . . , 1}n and all agents i ∈ [n], at most k of the values in each set
Bi,ω =
{
ωi′θ
(j)
i′
ωi
: i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, j ∈ [N ]
}
fall within any interval of length w. This follows from the following claim and a union bound.
Claim D.4. For a fixed ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈
{
1
r ,
2
r , . . . , 1
}n
and agent i ∈ [n], with probability
1− δnrn , at most k points from Bi,ω fall within any interval of width w.
Proof of Claim D.4. For each i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, let
Bi,i′,ω =
{
ωi′θ
(j)
i′
ωi
: j ∈ [N ]
}
.
Since
ωi′
ωi
≥ 1r , Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.1 implies that the points in Bi,i′,ω are independent draws
from a rκ-bounded distribution. The claim then follows from Lemma A.3 in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.15. For any agent i ∈ [n] and r ∈ Z≥1, Pdim (Fi,Mr) = O (n log n) .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary agent, and without loss of generality, suppose that agent is agent 1. Fix a
vector θ−1 = (θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ [0, 1]n−1. We denote the utility of agent 1 when the agents’ types are
(θ1,θ−1) and reported types are
(
θˆ1,θ−1
)
as uθ−1
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
, which maps Rn+2 to [−1, 1].
We now show that we can split Rn+2 into regions R where the allocation of the generalized
second-price auction is fixed across all
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
∈ R, given the fixed set of reported
types θ−1 = (θ2, . . . , θn). Let p¯i be a permutation of the n agents, and let Rp¯i ⊆ [0, 1]n+2 be the
set of all vectors
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
where the ordering of the elements
{
ω1θˆ1, ω2θ2, . . . , ωnθn
}
matches p¯i. Specifically, for all
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
∈ Rp¯i, if i′ = argmax
{
ω1θˆ1, ω2θ2, . . . , ωnθn
}
,
then p¯i(1) = i′ and if i′′ = argmin
{
ω1θˆ1, ω2θ2, . . . , ωnθn
}
, then p¯i(n) = i′′. By definition of the
generalized second-price auction, this means that the agent who receives the first slot is agent
p¯i(1) and the agent who receives the mth is agent p¯i(m). Therefore, for all
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
∈
Rp¯i, the allocation of the generalized second-price auction given agent weights (ω1, . . . , ωn) and
reported types
(
θˆ1,θ−1
)
is invariant. Next, consider the transformation φ :
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
7→(
θ1,
ω2
ω1
, . . . , ωnω1
)
. Since the vector θ−1 is fixed, the function uθ−1
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
is a fixed linear
function of φ
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
across all
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
∈ Rp¯i.
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Next, let S−1 =
{
θ
(1)
−1, . . . ,θ
(N)
−1
}
be a set of vectors that is shatterable by the set of functions
F1,Mr , where θ(j)−1 =
(
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
)
. This means there is a set of values z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R that
witnesses the shattering of S−1 by F1,Mr . Therefore, for every T ⊆ [N ], there exists a pair of values
θT , θˆT and a mechanism MT ∈ Mr such that u1,MT ,θT ,θˆT
(
θ
(j)
−1
)
≤ z(j) if and only if j ∈ T . Let
(ω1,T , . . . , ωn,T ) be the set of agent weights corresponding to each such mechanism MT . We define
the set R to be the set of 2N vectors R =
{(
θT , θˆT , ω1,T , . . . , ωn,T
)
: T ⊆ [N ]
}
⊂ Rn+2.
For each j ∈ [N ], let H(j) be the set of (n2)+ n− 1 hypersurfaces
H(j) =
{
ω1θˆ1 − ωiθ(j)i = 0 : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
}
∪
{
ωiθi − ωi′θ(j)i′ = 0 : i, i′ ∈ {2, . . . , n}
}
.
As we saw, as we range
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
over a single connected component of Rn+2 \ H(j),
the allocation of the generalized second-price auction with agent weights (ω1, . . . , ωn) and reported
types
(
θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
is invariant. If we define H = ⋃Nj=1H(j), then as we range (θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn)
over a single connected component of Rn+2 \ H, the allocations are fixed across all j ∈ [N ]. By
Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, the number of connected components is at most
2
(
4eN
((
n
2
)
+ n− 1)
n+ 2
)n+2
= 2 (2eN(n− 1))n+2 .
Next, fix a connected component C of Rn+2 \ H. We know that for each j ∈ [N ], there is a
constant αj ∈ [0, 1] and a bidder ij 6= 1 such that uθ(j)−1
(
θ1, θˆ1, ω1, . . . , ωn
)
= αj
(
θ1 − ωij θijω1
)
(where αj = 0 if agent i does not receive any slot). Consider the N hypersurfaces HC ={
αj
(
θ1 −
ωij t
(j)
ij
ω1
)
= z(j) : j ∈ [N ]
}
. We know that at most one vector in R can come from each
connected component of C \ HC , of which there are at most 2
(
4eN
n
)n
. In total, this means that
2N = |R| ≤ 4 (2eN(n− 1))n+2 (4eNn )n, so by Lemma A.2 in Appendix A, N = O(n log n).
Theorem 3.16. Suppose that each agent’s value for each marginal unit has a κ-bounded density
function. With probability 1 − δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, for
all agents i ∈ [n] and types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are
piecewise 1-Lipschitz and
(
O
(
1/
(
κ
√
N
))
, O˜
(
nm2
√
N
))
-dispersed.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary agent, and without loss of generality, suppose that agent is agent 1. Let
θ′1 ≤ θ′2 ≤ · · · ≤ θ′Nm(n−1) be the sorted values of
{
θ
(j)
i [µ] : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, j ∈ [N ], µ ∈ [m]
}
, and
define θ′0 = 0 and θ′Nm(n−1)+1 = 1. So long as agent 1’s bids fall between these sorted bids,
the allocation will be fixed across all samples. More formally, for each µ ∈ [m], so long as θ′i <
θˆ1[µ] < θ
′
i+1 for some i ∈ {0, . . . , Nm(n − 1)}, the resulting allocation will be fixed across all N
samples. Now, for a given sample θ
(j)
−1, consider a region R ⊆ [0, 1]m where the allocation of the
discriminatory auction given bids
(
θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
is invariant across all θˆ1 ∈ R. In particular, let mR be
the number of units allocated to agent 1. For a fixed θ1 ∈ [0, 1]m, agent 1’s utility will be linear
in θˆ1, because across all θˆ1 ∈ R, ui,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
=
∑mR
µ=1 θ1[µ]− θˆ1[µ]. Therefore, the functions
u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz.
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Note that across all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]m, the partition Pj splitting u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
into Lipschitz
portions is invariant. In particular, no matter the value of θ1, the partition Pj is delineated by
the set of m2(n− 1) hyperplanes Hj =
{
θ
(j)
i [µ]− θˆ1[µ′] = 0 : i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, µ, µ′ ∈ [m]
}
. For each
i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and pair µ, µ′ ∈ [m], let Bi,µ,µ′ be the set of hyperplanes
Bi,µ,µ′ =
{
θ
(j)
i [µ]− θˆ1[µ′] = 0 : j ∈ [N ]
}
.
Within each set, the hyperplanes are parallel with probability 1 and their offsets are indepen-
dently drawn from κ-bounded distributions. Therefore, by Lemma A.7 in Appendix A.1, with
probability 1 − δn , for all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(1)−1
)
, . . . , u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(N)−1
)
are(
O
(
1
κ
√
N
)
, O˜
(
nm2
√
N
))
-dispersed. The theorem holds by a union bound over the agents.
Lemma 3.19. For any agent i ∈ [n], any S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
, and any type θi ∈ [0, 1], the
functions ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and their discontinuities
fall in the set
{∥∥∥θ(j)−i ∥∥∥∞}j∈[N ].
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder, and without loss of generality, suppose that bidder is bidder
1. Next, choose an arbitrary sample θ
(j)
−1 =
(
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
)
. Letting j∗ = argmax
{
θ
(j)
2 , . . . , θ
(j)
n
}
and letting s(j) be the second-largest component of θ
(j)
−1, we know that either agent 1 will win and
pay
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞ or agent j∗ will win and pay the maximum of θˆ1 and s(j). Therefore, for any value
θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and bid θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1], we know that
u1,M
(
θ1, θˆ1,θ
(j)
−1
)
=

(α1 − 1)
(∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞ − s(j)) if θˆ1 ≤ s(j)
(α1 − 1)
(∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞ − θˆ1) if s(j) < θˆ1 ≤ ∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞
α1
(
θ1 −
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞) if θˆ1 > ∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞ .
(17)
This means that if θˆ1 >
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞, then u1,M (θ1, θˆ1,θ(j)−1) is a constant function of θˆ1, whereas if
θˆ1 ≤
∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞, then u1,M (θ1, θˆ1,θ(j)−1) is a continuous function of θˆ1 with a slope of either 0 (if
θˆ1 < s
(j)) or α1 − 1 (if θˆ1 ≥ s(j)). (See Figure 3 in Appendix D.) Since |α1 − 1| ≤ 1, this means
that for all θi ∈ [0, 1], the function u1,M
(
θ1, ·,θ(j)−1
)
is piecewise 1-Lipschitz with a discontinuity at∥∥∥θ(j)−1∥∥∥∞.
D.1 Uniform-price auctions
Under the uniform-price auction, the allocation rule is the same as in the discriminatory auction
(Section 3.2.4). However, all m units are sold at a “market-clearing” price, meaning that the total
amount demanded is equal to the total amount supplied. We adopt the convention [Krishna, 2002]
that the market-clearing price equals the highest losing bid. Let c−i ∈ Rm be the vector θˆ−i of
competing bids facing agent i, sorted in decreasing order and limited to the top m bids. This
means that c−i[1] =
∥∥∥θˆ−i∥∥∥∞ is the highest of the other bids, c−i[2] is the second-highest, and so
on. Agent i will win exactly one unit if and only if θˆi[1] > c−i[m] and θˆi[2] < c−i[m − 1]; that
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is, his bid must be higher than the lowest competing bid but not the second-lowest. Similarly,
agent i will win exactly two units if and only if θˆi[2] > c−i[m − 1] and θˆi[3] < c−i[m − 2]. More
generally, agent i will win exactly mi > 0 units if and only if θˆi [mi] > c−i [m−mi + 1] and
θˆi [mi + 1] < c−i [m−mi]. The market-clearing price, which equals the highest losing bid, is
p = max
{
θˆi [mi + 1] , c−i [m−mi + 1]
}
. In a uniform-price auction, agent i pays mip.
Theorem D.5. Suppose that each agent’s value for each marginal unit has a κ-bounded density
function. With probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets S−i =
{
θ
(1)
−i , . . . ,θ
(N)
−i
}
∼ DN−i, we have
that for all agents i ∈ [n] and types θi ∈ [0, 1]m, the functions
ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θi, ·,θ(N)−i
)
are piecewise 1-Lipschitz and
(
O
(
1
κ
√
N
)
, O
(
nm2
√
N log nδ
))
-dispersed.
Proof. This theorem follows by the exact same reasoning as Theorem 3.16.
Theorem D.6. For all agents i ∈ [n], all θˆi ∈ [0, 1]m, and all θ−i ∈ [0, 1](n−1)m, the function
ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof. So long as all bids are fixed, the allocation is fixed, so ui,M
(
·, θˆi,θ−i
)
is 1-Lipschitz function
as a function of the true type θi ∈ [0, 1]m.
Next, we prove the following pseudo-dimension bound.
Theorem D.7. For any agent i ∈ [n], the pseudo-dimension of the class Fi,M is O (m log(nm)).
Proof. This theorem follows by the exact same reasoning as Theorem 3.18.
E Approximate ex-ante incentive compatibility
Definition E.1 (Ex-ante approximate incentive compatibility (AIC)). A mechanism M is ex-ante
γ-AIC if for all agents i and all types θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ∼D [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)] ≥ Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− γ.
In this section, we show how to estimate an ex-ante incentive compatibility approximation
guarantee using data. Unlike Section 3 we do not assume that the agents’ types are independently
distributed. For each agent i ∈ [n], we receive a set Si of samples independently drawn from D.
For each mechanism M ∈M, we show how to use the samples to estimate a value γˆM such that:
With probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets of samples S1, . . . ,Sn, for any agent
i ∈ [n] and all types θˆi ∈ Θi, Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
≤ γˆM .
We begin with a parallel to Theorem 3.2. For any mechanism M , any agent i ∈ [n], and any
type θˆi ∈ Θi, let ui,M,θˆi : ×ni=1Θj → [−1, 1] be a function that maps the agents’ types θ to the utility
of agent i with type θi and reported type θˆi when the other agents report their types truthfully.
In other words, ui,M,θˆi (θ) = ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
. Let F ′i,M be the set of all such functions defined by
mechanisms M from the class M
(
F ′i,M =
{
ui,M,θˆi
∣∣∣ θˆi ∈ Θi,M ∈M}).
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Theorem E.1. With probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets Si =
{
θ(1), . . . ,θ(N)
} ∼ DN , for
every mechanism M ∈M and every agent i ∈ [n],
max
θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim
(
F ′i,M
)
.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary agent i ∈ [n]. By Theorem 3.1, we know that with probability at least
1− δ/n over the draw of Si, for all mechanisms M ∈M and all θˆi ∈ θi,
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤
√
2di
N
ln
eN
di
+
√
1
2N
ln
2n
δ
and
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− Eθ∼D [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)] ≤
√
2di
N
ln
eN
di
+
√
1
2N
ln
2n
δ
.
Therefore,
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− Eθ∼D [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)]
= Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)]
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− Eθ∼D [ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)]
≤ max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ).
Since the above inequality holds for all i ∈ [n] with probability 1− δ/n, a union bound implies
that with probability 1− δ, for all i ∈ [n] and all mechanism M ∈M,
max
θˆi∈Θi
{
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ M(N, δ),
where M(N, δ) = 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim
(
F ′i,M
)
.
44
Algorithm 2 Greedy cover construction for ex-ante incentive compatibility
Input: Mechanism M ∈M, set of samples Si =
{
θ(1), . . . ,θ(N)
}
, accuracy parameter  > 0.
1: Let U be the set of vectors
U ←

1
N

ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , θ
(1)
i ,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , θ
(N)
i ,θ
(N)
−i
)
 : θˆi ∈ Θi
 .
2: Let V ← ∅ and G ← ∅.
3: while U \ (⋃v∈V B1 (v, )) 6= ∅ do
4: Select an arbitrary vector v′ ∈ U \ (⋃v∈V B1 (v, )).
5: Let θˆi ∈ Θi be the type such that
v′ =
1
N

ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , θˆi,θ
(1)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , θ
(1)
i ,θ
(1)
−i
)
...
ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , θˆi,θ
(N)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , θ
(N)
i ,θ
(N)
−i
)
 .
6: Add v′ to V and θˆi to G.
Output: The cover G ⊆ Θi.
E.1 Ex-ante incentive compatibility guarantees via finite covers
The following is a variation on Theorem 3.3.
Theorem E.2. Given a set of samples Si =
{
θ(1), . . . ,θ(N)
}
, a mechanism M ∈M, and accuracy
parameter  > 0, let G (Si,M, ) be the cover returned by Algorithm 2. With probability 1− δ over
the draw of the n sets Si =
{
θ(1), . . . ,θ(N)
} ∼ DN , for every mechanism M ∈ M, every agent
i ∈ [n], and every θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
≤ max
θˆi∈G(Si,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ + O˜
(√
di
N
)
, (18)
where di = Pdim
(
F ′i,M
)
. Moreover, with probability 1, |G (Si,M, )| ≤ (8eN/ (di))2di.
Proof. Let θˆ∗i be the type in Θi that maximizes
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
.
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By definition of the set G (Si,M, ), we know there exists θˆ′i ∈ G (Si,M, ) such that
max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆ
∗
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ 
≤ max
θˆi∈G(Si,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ .
Therefore, by this inequality and Theorem E.1, we know that with probability at least 1− δ,
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
− max
θˆi∈G(Si,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
=Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi, θi,θ−i)
]
− max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
+ max
θˆi∈Θi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− max
θˆi∈G(Si,M,)
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ ++ O˜
(√
di
N
)
.
The bound on |G (Si,M, )| follows from Lemma C.1.
Next, the following is a variation on Lemma 3.4. For the rest of this section, we assume
Θi = [0, 1]
m.
Lemma E.3. Suppose that for each i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with probability
1− δ over the n sets Si =
{
θ(j)
}
j∈[N ], for each M ∈M and i ∈ [n], the functions
ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , ·,θ(N)−i
)
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are piecewise Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed. Then with probability 1 − δ over the draw of the
n sets Si ∼ DN , for all M ∈M and i ∈ [n],
max
θˆi∈[0,1]m
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
≤ max
θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ Liwi + 2kiN . (19)
Proof. By definition of dispersion, we know that with probability 1− δ over the draw of the n sets
Si =
{
θ(1), . . . ,θ(N)
} ∼ DN , for all mechanisms M ∈ M, all agents i ∈ [n], and all reported types
θˆi, θˆ
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, if
∥∥∥θˆi − θˆ′i∥∥∥
1
≤ wi, then∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆ
′
i,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN . (20)
By definition of Gw, there must be a point pˆ ∈ Gw such that
∥∥∥pˆ− θˆi∥∥∥
1
≤ wi. By Equation (20),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Liwi + 2kiN .
Therefore, with probability 1− δ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , pˆ,θ
(j)
−i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣+ Liwi + kiN .
Since pˆ ∈ Gwi , the lemma statement holds.
We conclude with a variation on Theorem 3.5.
Theorem E.4. Suppose that for each i ∈ [n], there exist Li, ki, wi ∈ R such that with probability
1− δ over the n sets Si =
{
θ(j)
}
j∈[N ], for each M ∈M and i ∈ [n], the functions
ui,M
(
θ
(1)
i , ·,θ(1)−i
)
, . . . , ui,M
(
θ
(N)
i , ·,θ(N)−i
)
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are piecewise Li-Lipschitz and (wi, ki)-dispersed. Then with probability 1−2δ, for every mechanism
M ∈M and every i ∈ [n],
max
θˆi∈[0,1]m
{
Eθ∼D
[
ui,M
(
θi, θˆi,θ−i
)
− ui,M (θi,θi,θ−i)
]}
≤ max
θˆi∈Gwi
 1N
N∑
j=1
ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i , θˆi,θ
(j)
−i
)
− ui,M
(
θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
i ,θ
(j)
−i
)+ ,
where  = Liwi +
ki
N + 2
√
2di
N ln
eN
di
+ 2
√
1
2N ln
2n
δ and di = Pdim
(
F ′i,M
)
.
Proof. This theorem follows from Theorem E.1 and Lemma E.3 in the exact same way that Theo-
rem 3.5 follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.4.
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